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The Making of the Moral Child:
Legal Implications of
Values Education
JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ*
SUMMARY
The development of moral character in children is at once one
of education's most ancient offices and most recent vogues.
In simpler times, the socialization of children consisted of the
straightforward process of indoctrinating them with generally ac-
cepted precepts, values and virtues. The modern incarnation of
values education in state-run compulsory schools, however, is the
product of constant buffeting by contradictory legal and social
forces. On the one hand, as Justice Powell noted "in an age when
the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the char-
acter and value judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility
falls upon the schools."' The various state legislatures have unre-
servedly -turned to moral education as the patent medicine for a
vast array of social ills. On the other hand, the schools are less
well armed than formerly to undertake this awesome task. Not
only are instruction in, and the sanctions of religion no longer
available, 2 but the very lack of social cohesion which makes moral
instruction seem imperative has generated a legal and political
battleground concerning whose values, virtues and lifestyles, if
any, ought to be imposed on the young.3
* Deputy Attorney General, State of California; B.A., 1967, J.D., 1970, Univer-
sity of California (Los Angeles). Mr. Moskowitz is on the Governing Board of the
Folsom Cordova Unified School District and is the author of LAw IN THE SCHOOL -
A GUIDE FOR CALIFORNIA TEACHERS, PARENTS AND STUDENTS (2d ed. 1976). The
opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those
of his office.
1. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. Infra note 35.
3. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the apparently
unique quality of Amish life, the capacity of the Amish community to shape re-
sponsible individuals, and the "inseparable and interdependent" nature of their
American education has responded to these contrary demands
with great inventiveness, placing renewed emphasis on values ed-
ucation and infusing such education throughout the curriculum,
while at the same time adopting a relativistic stance and draining
the instruction of any substantive content, in an attempt not to of-
fend either the Supreme Court's view of the Constitution or the
views of angry parents on proper moral instruction.
It is the thesis of this article that the schools, in attempting to
satisfy everyone will in the end satisfy only a few, least of all the
courts, and that certain facets of the new moral instruction pose
palpable threats to religious liberty, parental rights and the pri-
vacy rights of children.
It may be that the societal mandate is contradictory which pro-
poses "that students be indoctrinated with accepted values while
being taught that freedom permits departure from these values."4
It may be that no final resolution is possible between the compet-
ing claims of those who assert a prior right to attempt to mold the
character of children so long as "public education actively at-
tempts to shape a child's personal development in a manner cho-
sen not by the child or his parents but by the state."5 It may
finally be that values education will be unproductive or counter-
productive so long as it proceeds on the belief "that man can do
what God cannot, namely, manipulate others for their own salva-
tion."6
Despite these uncertainties, indeed because of them, this article
concludes with a proposed map of this constitutional no-man's
religious faith and mode of life combined to support the Court's unusual decision
to exempt Amish children from Wisconsin's compulsory education laws. It was
held that secondary schooling unduly impinged an Amish free exercise by expos-
ing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals and values
contrary to beliefs and by substantially interferring with the religious develop-
ment of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith
community at the crucial adolesent stage of development," 406 U.S. at 218. J. Mos-
kowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REV. 623 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Moskowitz]; identifying the recent trend to return control over the
education of children to their parents on constitutional, rather than statutory,
grounds; G. LANouE & B. SMrrH, THE PoLrICs OF SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION 19
(1973), noting the hopes of some advocates of school decentralization "to use the
schools to encourage ethnic solidarity and challenge traditional American myths."
4. M. Rosenfeld, Religious Rights of Public School Teachers, 23 U.C.L.A. L
REV. 763, 764 (1976); See James v. Board of Ed. of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566,
567 (2d Cir. 1972); cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), which tries to locate that nar-
row ground, between the unreasonable censorship of a teacher's classroom speech
and the dangerous lack of sufficient restraint, where a student can be exposed to
and benefit from the free marketplace of ideas and yet avoid the indoctrination of
the views of an individual teacher.
5. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 619
(1971).
6. .ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY 73 (1970).
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land and advances a test against which governmental attempts to
impose state-approved emotional, philosophical or spiritual char-
acteristics on children, or to negate those taught by parents, may
be measured. While it is submitted that values education is es-
sential in public education, and that the proposed test fully ac-
comodates any reasonable collectivist interest of the state in the
values and ethics of the young, much of what is today called "val-
ues education" fails this test and should be expelled from our
public schools.
I. BEYOND THE "THREE R's": A BRIEF HISTORY OF VALUES
EDUCATION IN AMERICA
No court to date has seriously questioned the proposition that
the public schools might rightfully attempt to pass on more than
intellectual skills and knowledge to their students. To the con-
trary, those courts which have considered the matter have indi-
cated in dicta that educating children for the improvement of
their moral and psychological development is a lauditory, even
essential activity. Thus, the Supreme Court could take notice in
Brown v., Board of Education7 of the following proposition, which
is apparently regarded as self-evident: "Today [education] is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values...
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment."
School instruction has been seen not only as a means of instilling
"democratic values,"8 but as a prime force in "shaping the stu-
dent's emotional and psychological make-up." 9 Indeed, some
courts view the molding of the child's psyche as more important
than teaching him basic knowledge or skills.1O
While the courts do not cite authority to support these observa-
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
8. As the California Supreme Court noted in Serrano, supra note 5 at 608:
"The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the role of public
education as a unifying social force and the basic tool for shaping democratic val-
ues." Iciting McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) and Abing-
ton School Dist. v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)]
9. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 483 (D.C. 1967), affd sub. nom., Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969), quoted in Serrano v. Priest, supra note 5, at 610.
Here there was a focus on aptitude tests used in placing students in different pro-
grams and their tendency to reinforce existing systems of racial and economic seg-
regation.
10. For example, in Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Mic. 80, 92 189 A. 131, 137
(1937), thecourt remarked that "the instilling of worthy habits, attitudes, apprecia-
tion and skills is far more important than [the] mere imparting of subject matter."
tions, other than occasional references to each other, perhaps this
is because these views are a truism in light of American educa-
tional history.
As a corrollary of the close relationship between church and
state, schools in the colonial period were dominantly religious in
purpose and content, were controlled by established religions,
and existed largely to inculcate orthodoxy in their students."1 As
an example, a seminal educational law, the "old Deluder Satan
Act" of 1647, was premised on the proposition that reading and
writing must be taught because "the one chief project of the old
deluder Satan [is] to keep men from. the knowledge of the scrip-
tures."12
Not only were children in our early schools often required to at-
tend chapel and say prayers,13 but a survey of their courses of in-
struction indicates that character development was a primary
purpose of education.' 4 For example, an early textbook, the New
England Primer, published in 1690, contained the following repre-
sentative lesson:
Fear God all Day
Parents obey
No False thing say
By no Sin Stray
Love Christ alway
In Secret Pray
Mind little Play
Make no Delay 15
The dominance of public education by religious groups weak-
ened with the disappearance of established churches, increased
pluralism of religious groups and mounting pressure for the
11. R. BuTrs & L. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 98,
120, 191 (1953) [hereinafter cited as BuTrs & CREMIN]. The reaction to control of
public education by established religions led to, among other things, a demand for
alternative, private forms of education. Id. at 98.
12. A. MEYER, AN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD 189 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as MEYER], which traces Puritan concern for the inculcation of
Calvinism in Massachusetts schools. See L. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION, THE
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-1783 394 (1970), which briefly examines the NEW EN-
GLAND PRIMER and other elementary textbooks; BUrs & CREMIN, supra note 11, at
119-20, noting the highly moral and religious tone of reading exercises found in co-
lonial primers. Likewise, the Northwest ordinance of 1787 encouraged schools to
foster "religion, morality and knowledge," presumably in that order. This task was
to be accomplished by earmarking the sixteenth section out of every township for
public schools and their maintenance. R. Simpson, Church and State Implications
for Educators Continue, 4 NOLPE SCHOOL L. J. 170, 171 (1974); Butts & Cremin,
supra note 11 at 245.
13. D. Thomas, A Short History of Moral Education, in CAL. SCHOOL BOARDS 4
(Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS]; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 267-68 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring), which reviews the requirement of
prayer in public schools in this country since the colonial period.
14. Note 13 supra.
15. Quoted in MEYER, supra note 12, at 192.
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teaching of "practical knowledge" needed in an expanding econ-
omy.16 By 1833, the separation of church and state was an almost
universally accepted legal injunction in America.17
This is not to say, however, that moral and religious teachings
were removed from the classroom. Rather, to accomodate the in-
creased religious pluralism, the schools endeavored to teach the
"common elements of Christianity," and stressed reading of the
Bible without comment.18 This compromise, however, offended
both Catholics and the more orthodox Protestants.19 Notwith-
standing, the schools progressively barred the teaching of reli-
gious tenets, while striving to instill basic Christian morality.20
Renewed emphasis began to be placed on teaching values
when, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, large
groups of immigrants introduced cultural values, mores and reli-
gious beliefs which differed from those of the prevailing American
culture.2 1 In responding to this development, some American ed-
ucators were motivated by an altruistic desire to help the immi-
grants adjust to their new society. Others saw in these diverse
peoples not only the importation of the political and religious
strife of their native lands, accentuated as they clashed with each
other, but also the erosion of peculiarly American values, institu-
tions and beliefs as the existing population was deluded with
alien "huddled masses yearning to breathe free, [tihe wretched
16. Burrs & CREMIN, supra note 11, at 98-100, 222.
17. Id. at 215.
18. Id.; Horace Mann, in his Twelfth Annual Report, brought a popular and
distinctly Protestant outlook to bear on what he saw as essentially non-sectarian
moral instruction in the public schools. "[O]ur system earnestly inculcates all
Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it welcomes the re-
ligion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do what it is allowed
to do in no other system,---to speak for itself." Id.; Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, supra note 13, at 268-70, which notes that controversy over religious in-
struction in public schools centered principally "about the elimination of plainly
sectarian practices and textbooks, and led to the eventual substitution of non-sec-
tarian, though still religious, exercises and material."
19. Burrs & CREMIN, supra note 11, at 216, 272-73. Roman Catholic clergy ob-
jected that reading the Bible without comment was only a sly inculcation of Prot-
estant principals, in that a Catholic outlook demanded that religion be taught
under clerical authority. On the other hand, more conservative Protestant ele-
ments worried that a lack of accompanying comment would invariably "leave the
mind in a state of doubt and skepticism." Id. at 216.
20. Id. at 273.
21. C. Douglas, Parental Rights in Public Schools, LIBERTY 19-20 (Sept.-Oct.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Douglas]; M. Rothbard, Historical Origins, THE TWELVE
YEAR SENrENCE 20-22 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 1974); Burrs & CREMN, supra note 11,
at 191-92.
refuse of a teeming shore."22 Both schools of thought united in
viewing the public schools as the principal means of insuring that
America would indeed be a "melting pot," as increased emphasis
was placed on instruction in citizenship and loyalty to a national
state.23
In light of this strong and pervasive effort, it is remarkable that
by the 1920's, and certainly by the 1930's and 1940's, religious-as
well as moral and ethical-instruction had all but disappeared
from the public schools. 24
Several reasons have been given for this. One of the most eas-
ily verifiable, and perhaps therefore the most overemphasized, is
the Supreme Court's reaction to some of the more zealous in-
tegrative efforts and its warnings concerning extreme manifesta-
tions of the "melting pot" philosophy of values education. Thus,
in 1922, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching
of foreign languages in public or private schools below the eighth
grade.25 The statute was passed in furtherance of values educa-
tion dogma, pursuant to the quaint idea that those who learn a
22. Quotation from Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (inscribed on the
Statue of Liberty, New York Harbor). See L. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON
SCHOOL, AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION, 22-23, 44-47 (1951); Burrs & CREMIN, supra note
11, at 191-92; ROTHBORD, supra note 21 at 20-22.
For example, Benjanin Larabee, president of Middlebury College, expressed
concern about the multitude of immigrants who were "rapidly changing the iden-
tity of the American character," and worried that these people "will prove to our
republic what the Goths and Huns were to the Roman Empire," in the absence of
the intercession of the "wisdom and fidelity of our teachers." CREMIN (1970), supra
note 12 at 45; Burrs & CREMIN, supra note 11, at 192; ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at
20-21.
Horace Mann opined that unless society were rendered more cohesive by Amer-
ican values being "sedulously inculcated upon all the children of the Republic,"
violence and rebellion might erupt. ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at 22. George Chee-
ver wrote of the "great danger from the dark and stolid infidelity and vicious radi-
calism of a large portion of the foreign immigrating population," and prescribed
the public schools as the means to "defeat the working of that malignant, social,
anti-Christian poison." GEORGE B. CHEEVER, RIGHT OF THE BIBLE IN OUR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, 112-13 (1859); quoted in CREMIN, supra note 12, at 47, and in ROTHBARD,
supra note 21, at 21.
23. Burrs & CREMIN, supra note 11, at 191.
Some scholars condemn this effort as one of "rubber-stamping children of newly
arrived immigrants and turning out millions of standardized Americans" (Doug-
las, supra note 21, at 20), and as being an attempt to "shape and render uniform
all American citizens.., to stamp all citizens as Americans, and to impose cohe-
sion and stability on the often unruly and diverse aspirations of the disparate citi-
zens who make up the country." ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at 22. At least as to
some aspects of this effort, the Supreme Court has shared this skepticism. See
text at notes 25 et. seq.
24. R. Graham, Moral Education. A Child's Right to a Just Community, ELE-
MENTARY SCHOOL GuIDANCE AND COUNSELING 299 (May, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Graham]; D. Purpel & K. Ryan, Moral Education: Where Sages Fear to Tread, PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 659 (Jun. 1975); Thomas, supra note 13, at 4.
25. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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foreign language too soon "must always think in the language,
and, as a consequence, [this will] naturally inculcate in them the
ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this coun-
try."26
In rejecting this measure, the Court took the occasion to warn
educators that they should not attempt to go too far in their ef-
forts "to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens." 27
Citing the repressive efforts toward standardization advocated by
Plato and practiced in ancient Sparta, the Court cautioned that
"[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by
men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between the
individual and the State were wholly different from those upon
which our institutions rest."28
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,29 the Court was
even more explicit. In striking down a stature which outlawed at-
tendance at private schools, including parochial schools, by stu-
dents below the eighth grade, the Court warned that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State," and denied that there was
any "general power of the State to standardize its children."30
Nothing more on this subject was heard from the Court for almost
two decades, but when the Court again spoke, it delivered its
strongest and most eloquent attack on the schools as "melting
pots."
In Board of Education v. Barnette,31 the Court declared that
students could not be required to salute the flag. This holding
was remarkable: First, because the Court reversed its own hold-
ing issued only three years previously;32 and secondly, in that it
was rendered in the midst of World War II. Perhaps because of
these factors, the Court felt a special burden to justify this deci-
26. Id. at 398.
27. Id. at 402.
28. Id.
29. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30. Id. at 535.
31. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). At issue was a West Virginia statute requiring a flag
salute (admitted by the U.S. Flag Association to be "quite similar" to the Nazi-
Facist salute) and prescribing expulsion for those failing to conform. Id. at 627-29.
Suit was brought to enjoin enforcement of the statute by parents of non-con-
forming Jehovah's Witnesses who considered it a violation of the divine injunction
against the worship of graven images. Id. at 629.
32. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The Court had
grounded its opinion on the important legislative goals of "national cohesion," "na-
tional unity," and "national security." Id. at 595.
sion, and discharged this burden in large measure by a ringing at-
tack on the "melting pot" school of values education:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. Nationalism i:s a relatively recent phenome-
non but at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial
security, support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving
souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those
bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of
our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it neces-
sary to choose what doctrine and whose program public education officials
shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such at-
tempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Ro-
man drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the
Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles
as a means to Russian unity down to the fast failing efforts of our present
totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent
soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.33
Are these cases sufficient to explain in significant part the pre-
cipitous decline in values education? It seems unlikely. Their
holdings were quite limited and their dicta, while strongly
worded, were far from certain in their application.
It is also unlikely that the cases decided in the early 1960's out-
lawing religious exercise-such as praying and Bible reading-in
the public schools34 were a primary cause for a development
dated decades earlier.35
While other factors have been cited,36 the most plausible expla-
nation for this decline is that the interaction between the educa-
33. 319 U.S. at 640-41. In further response to educationists such as Larabee,
Mann, and Cheever, who viewed with alarm the influx of those with alien cultures
and philosophies (supra note 22), the Court proclaimed that there was no reason
to "fear that freedom to be intellectually or spiritually diverse or even contrary
will disintegrate the social organization." Id. at 1341. Far from desiring a "melting
pot," the Court praised the country's "intellectual individualism and (its] rich cul-
tural diversities." Id. at 641-42. Finally, it declared that "no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other mat-
ters of opinion." Id. at 642. Obviously, values education, as it had been practiced,
would be hard to reconcile with these dicta.
34. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Still operating on Mann's thesis that a
denominationally neutral religious exercise could be achieved, the New York
State Board of Regents recommended the following prayer be said aloud at the be-
ginning of each school day: "Almighty God we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our coun-
try." Id. at 422; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962).
35. Of course, these decisions were presaged by opinions of some state courts
and state attorneys general. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp 374 U.S. at 275-
76 (Brennan, J., concurring); e.g., Board of Edue. v. Minor, 23 Ohio 211 (1872).
36. One such too-simple answer is that "moral education all but disappeared
in the 1930's and 1940's not so much because it transgressed rights but because it
was ineffective. Beginning with the Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) studies there
has been evidence that attempts to instill culturally approved moral virtues in
[Vol. 6: 105, 1978] Values Education
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tional system and the millions of immigrants was not one-sided.
While the schools labored to indoctrinate children with American
cultural values, the immigrants introduced a large dose of plural-
ism into that culture.37 Non-protestant immigrants reacted to the
moral curriculum not only by establishing parochial schools, but
also by vigorously protesting teachings and practices not in har-
mony with their religious views.38 Always sensitive to contro-
versy, the schools gradually learned to steer far wide of the
disputed zone.39 The moral consensus upon which values educa-
tion had been based was not only diluted by the addition of immi-
grants from without, it was eroded from within as well, as
industrialization accelerated urbanization and caused a weaken-
ing of family ties and church influence4 0
The very loss of social cohesion which made moral education so
controversial, so unsuccessful and so sparse, ironically made it
more necessary. State legislatures, facing dramatic increases in
crime, drug use and other symptoms of social malaise, turned to
the public schools to somehow "educate" their captive audience
to avoid these behaviors. They drafted impressive catalogues of
moral beliefs and behaviors41 and enjoined educators to infuse
these desiderata into their charges. A representative example of
such legislation is section 87705 of the California Education Code,
which provides:
schools has had little effect on behavior." Graham, supra note 24, at 299, citing 1-3
H. HARTSHORNE & M. A. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER (1928-1930).
There is scant evidence or logical appeal supporting the proposition that a na-
tional mission so vigorously begun would be so quickly abandoned once the above
conclusions were made public. More to be expected would be an increase in effort
or a change in method, rather than the relegation of moral education to a museum
of failed, hopeless tasks. As an analogy, should a study reveal that the composi-
tions of high school graduates manifest little application of their studies of gram-
mer, one would hardly expect the schools to give up in dispair further attempts to
teach grammer.
Another view, advanced by Professor Michael Walzer of Harvard University,
who associates the decline in moral education with the emergence of a culture
dedicated to individualism and scientific objectivity; which regards morals as
deeply personal, rather than the manifestation of shared commitments, and per-
ceives discussion of moral questions as "unscientific, [and] a sign of weakness
and sentimentality." M. Walzer, Teaching Morality, THE NEW REPUBLIC 12 (June
12, 1978).
37. Purpel & Ryan, supra note 24 at 659, 660.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. A comprehensive review of these enactments is to be found in L. Edelman,
Basic American, 6 NOLPE SCHOOL L. J. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Edelman].
113
Each instructor shall endeavor to impress upon the minds of the stu-
dents the principles of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and a true com-
prehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship,
including kindness toward domestic pets and the humane treatment of
creatures, to teach them to avoid idleness, profanity, and falsehood, and to
instruct them in manners and morals and the principles of free govern-
ment.42
Other states require inculcation of such virtues as "temperance,
purity, public spirit, patriotism [and] international peace," "defer-
ence to old age," "the practice of every Christian virtue," and "the
obligation of every citizen to stand ready to defend our country at
all times from infiltration or aggression by those whose acts and
ideologies are contrary to our American philosophy of life."'43 This
emphasis on moral instruction is reflected in the fact that 16% of
all statements related to goals developed by state departments of
education are devoted to moral education.44
The problem with these laudatory laws is that virtually none of
them indicate how the task of turning out students permeated
with these often abstract virtues is to be accomplished.45 Not
only did the new crop of teachers lack the training, knowledge or
experience to undertake this task, but the contrary forces which
had caused moral instruction to become all but obsolete were still
present, if not intensified.4 6 The result of the buffeting of the
schools by these conflicting demands and forces has been, until
recently, inertia, if not paralysis. 47
Educators, however, still believed that morals should be
taught,4 8 and the demands of the legislatures could not be wholly
ignored. Therefore, within the last few years, a large and eager
market for new curricula of moral education has emerged. It is to
an examination of the nature and legal implications of these cur-
ricula which have moved in to fill the moral vacuum in education
that we now turn our attention.
A. The New Values Education: Process Without Product
At least a dozen books, with total sales of over a million copies,
as well as scores of articles, have recently been published dealing
42. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 87705 (West 1978).
43. Edelman, supra note 41, at 91-92, 94.
44. R. Hill, Rationales for Moral Education, in CAuFORNIA SCHOOL BoARDs 8
(Sept. 1976).
45. Edelman, supra note 41, at 91.
46. Thomas, supra notes 13 & 14.
47. Id.
48. Id.; D. Peckenpaugh, Moral Education: The Role of the School in Public
and Individual Morality, (Proceedings of the National Conference on Citizenship
Education, Salt Lake City, 1976) excerpted in CALIFORNIA SCHOOL BoARDs (Sept.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Peckenpaugh].
[Vol. 6:105, 1978] Values Education
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
with the subject of values education.49 Their influence on a public
school system under legislative and societal mandate to redirect
its energies and attention to the subject has been enormous. As a
result, courses, units and workshops on values have prolifer-
ated.50
Two rival schools of thought have dominated this renaissance.
After a description of each through the eyes of its proponents, we
will explore their legal implications.
The first of these, and the more influential, is known as "Values
Clarification." 5 1 Its aim, as its name implies, is to teach students
to "clarify" their values, while assiduously avoiding "imposing" or
"indoctrination" of values.5 2
Values Clarification is "not based upon the assumption that ab-
solute goods exist and can be known."53 Its task "is not to iden-
tify and transmit the 'right' values,5 4 but to help a student clarify
his own values so that he can obtain the values that best suit him
and his environment."5 5 This aim is carried out by assisting stu-
dents to (1) choose beliefs and behaviors, (2) prize (publicly af-
firm) the beliefs and behaviors they have chosen and (3) act on
49. H. KIRSCHENBAUM, ADVANCED VALUE CLARIFICATION, 1, 153-87 (1977) [here-
inafter cited at KIRSCHENBAUM]. This book contains an annotated bibliography of
185 publications from 1965-1975.
50. D. Loggins, Clarifying What and How Well? HEALTH EDUCATION 2 (March-
April, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Loggins]; KRSCHENBAUM.I, supra note 49, at 1.
51. For a historical background of the development of this approach, see KiR-
SCHENBAuM supra note 49 at 139-43.
52. S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KiRSCHENBAUM, VALUES CLARIFICATION, A HAND-
BOOK OF PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 15-17 (1972) [herein-
after cited as SIMON, HOWE & KIRSCHENBAUMI, which discusses the shortcomings
and dangers of attempting to instill values by "moralizing" or "direct inculcation";
J. Goodman, Sid Simon on Values: No Moralizers or Manipulators Allowed, in NA-
TIONS SCHOOLS 40 (December 1973), an interview with one of the leading propo-
nents of values clarification.
53. M. Harmin & S. Simon, Values, in THE TEACHER'S HANDBOOK 694 (D. Allen
& E. Seifman eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Harmin & Simon]. While allowing
that some proponents of Values Clarification entertain absolute values, its prem-
ise is that the validity of values is not subject to proof and thus "To the church, we
must say, 'We don't know."' KiRSCHENBAUM, supra note 49 at 13; H. Kirschen-
baum, M. Harrnin, L Howe, & S. Simon, In Defense of Values Clarification, A Posi-
tion Paper, 5 (monograph, National Humanistic Education Center, 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe & Simon (1975)].
54. Note 53 supra; S. Simon, Three Ways to Teach Church School, in READINGS
IN VALUES CLARIFICATION 237-40 (H. Kirschenbaum & S. Simon eds. 1973) [herein-
after cited as Simon] ("Values are very complex and very personal: there are not
'right values."'); I HOWE & M. HOWE, PERSONALIZING EDUCATION, VALUES CLARIFI-
CATION AND BEYOND 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HOWE & HowE].
55. Harmin and Simon, supra note 53, at 694.
the basis of these beliefs. 56
Unlike many abstract educational theories, whose operational
meaning in concrete classroom activities is a matter of some con-
jecture, proponents of Values Clarification have developed exten-
sive classroom activities ("strategies"') designed to implement the
theory.57 These exercises consist of questions posed to students
which encourage them to state their value preferences. Initial
value choices may elicit further questions, such as whether the
student freely chose the value, whether he or she is proud to hold
it, whether he or she acts on it and what the consequences of that
value might be in given situations.5 8
The questions posed are addressed to such diverse areas as
"politics, religion, work, leisure time, school, love, sex, family, ma-
terial possessions, culture [art, music, literature], personal taste
[clothes, hair style, etc.], friends, money, aging, death, health,
race, war-peace, rules [and] authority."59
A competing school of moral education, one which shares much
in common with Values Clarification, 60 and is likewise increas-
56. SIMON, HOWE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 19-20; HoWE & HOWE,
supra note 55, at 19. These three steps are elaborated into seven sub-steps of (1)
choosing values freely, (2) choosing from alternatives, (3) choosing after consider-
ation of consequences, (4) prizing and cherishing these values, (5) sharing and
publicly affirming these values, (6) acting upon these values, and (7) acting upon
these values repeatedly and consistently. Id. Also KRSCHENBAUM, supra note 49,
at 8-9.
57. E.g., SIMON, HOWE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52; E. MORRISION & M.
PRICE, VALUES IN SEXUALrY, A NEW APPROACH TO SEX EDUCATION (1974); HOWE &
HOWE, supra note 55.
58. SIMON, HOWE, & KiRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52 at 20.
59. Id. at 15. Some few examples from this work are extracted here, and while
admittedly not a random sample, illustrate that, the classroom questioning can be
quite personal:
How many of you.., go to church or temple regularly?... enjoy going to
church or temple?.., are in love right now'?... would choose to die and
go to heaven if it meant playing a harp all day? . . . have a hole in your
sock right now?.., use a spray deodorant?... like to look at pictures of
nude women/men? ... would be upset if organized religion disappeared?
... think that parents would be upset if organized religion disappeared?
... think that parents should teach their children to masturbate?"
Id. at 41-52; "Are you ... More like a 'No Trespassing' sign or a 'Public Fishing'
sign?" Id. at 95-6. Students are asked to rate themselves on a continuum as to
whether their feelings about premarital sex are more like "Virginal Vir-
ginia-wears white gloves on every date" or "mattress Millie, wears a mattress
strapped to her back." Id. at 123; "What disturbs you most about your parents?"
Id. at 148; "Did you ever write a love letter to a girl (or boy)?" Id. at 153; "Do you
love your parents?" Id. at 155; "What do you think happens to people after they
die?" Id. at 157; "Tell where you stand on the topic of masturbation ... Share the
most intense religious experience of your life... Tell something about a frighten-
ing sexual experience." Id. at 180; "Recall the last ten times you cried. What was
each about?" Id. at 239; "Are you someone who ... will change your religion?...
is a thoughtful lover?" Id. at 369, 371.
60. KrRsCHENBAUM, supra note 49, at 4344.
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ingly popular,61 is based upon cross-cultural research which con-
cludes that the ways in which people think about moral issues
progress universally from lower to higher "stages. ' 62 The aim of
education under this theory is to lead students to evaluate moral
questions from progressively more advanced perspectives. This is
accomplished by posing "moral dilemmas" and then by stimulat-
ing discussion at stages just beyond the students' present level of
development. 63
Like Values Clarification, this theory eschews moralizing and,
indeed, devotes its entire attention to the pz:ocess and structure of
moral reasoning, with no direct concern for the product. Unlike
Values Clarification, we are given few concrete examples of how
this cross-cultural-process abstraction operates in the classroom.
Unless a distinction is clearly called for, however, both theories
will be addressed sub nom "modern values education."
II. A LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF MODERN VALUES EDUCATION
As has been set forth, modern values education is the response
61. J. Fraenkel, The Kohlberg Bankwagon: Some Reservations, SOCIAL EDUCA-
TION 216 (April 1976) [hereinafter cited as Fraenkel]. Fraenkel finds at least four
serious problems with the Values Clarification theory: first, that a morality based
on the concept of justice, which underlies the theory, has been shown by anthro-
pologists to be far from universal; second, that it is impossible to prove that
"higher" stages of moral development are necessarily better, and, therefor, there is
little justification for trying to "improve" a child's moral reasoning; third, that
since, by the estimation of a leading proponent of the theory, only ten percent of
the population reach the highest stages of moral development, some effort should
be directed to more firmly entrench whatever degree of conventional morality can
be achieved by the individual; and fourth, that the requirement of values clarifica-
tion theorists that "the teacher's verbalizations must be one step above the level
of the child" places unrealistic demands on the moral capacity of most classroom
teachers. Id. at 217-18.
62. Graham, supra note 24; L. Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCALAIZATION THE-
ORY AND RESEARCH 376 (D. A. Goslin ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Kohlberg]
which contains a table of stages; Fraenkel, supra note 61, at 216.
Simply put, at Stages 1 and 2, moral questions are resolved on the basis of
avoiding physical punishment and obtaining rewards. At Stages 3 & 4, moral value
resides in obtaining the approval of others and maintaining the conventional so-
cial order. At Stage 5, values are seen as having an arbitrary element and being
the subject of a "social contract." Those values which have been examined and
democratically accepted are seen as "right." At the highest stage, Stage 6, individ-
uals respond to their own consciences, looking not to existing social rules, but to
universal principles. Graham, supra, note 24, at 301-08; Fraenkel, supra note 61, at
216-17; Kohlberg, supra at 376; E. Fenton, Moral Education: The Research
Findings, SocIAL EDUCATION 189 (April 1976).
63. Graham, supra, note 24, at 303-04.
of the schools to opposing legal and social forces. On the one
hand, there is the requirement of the legislatures, reflecting the
common concern that children be inculcated with certain essen-
tial moral and social values; and on the other hand, there is the
concern of the courts and parents of pluralistic backgrounds that
such values, and the manner in which they are taught, be inoffen-
sive. The fairest assessment of such educational innovations, and
the one most predictive of their legal future, is the degree to
which these efforts have been properly responsive to the legal
forces which spawned them.
A. Values Education v. Values Legislation
It requires no depth of analysis to conclude that the public
schools have translated quite specific legislation requiring that
enumerated values be taught 64 into an abstract injunction that
they give "more attention" to values education in the curriculum.
Except in the most superficial sense the effort has been
nonresponsive, for both schools of modern values education ex-
press no concern for whether students emerge from their pro-
grams imbued with the legislatively prescribed values or their
opposites, as they shun all ["indoctrination"] and focus exclu-
sively on the "structure" and "process" of valuing, to the exclu-
sion of directing children to predetermined values. 65 Criticizing
this aspect of Values Clarification, one commentator noted: "It is
possible to conceive of one going through the several value crite-
ria [the seven valuing processes] and deciding that he values in-
tolerance or thievery."66 In the same vein, a British professor of
education observed of the "moral stage" theory, that "[t]he po-
liceman cannot always be present, and if I am lying in the gutter
after being robbed it is somewhat otiose to speculate at what
stage the mugger is. My regret must surely be that he had not at
least got a conventional morality well instilled in him."67 The
problem is not merely however, that modern values education is
nonresponsive to the legislative mandates-it appears to be con-
sciously counter-responsive. It is not consistent to operate on the
premise that values are "relative, personal [and] situational,"68
and yet "impress upon the minds of the students" that they
64. See text at notes 41-44 supra.
65. See text at notes 51-54, 59-62 supra. "[Values Clarification] is not con-
cerned with the content of people's values, but the process of valuing." SIMON,
HowE & KiRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 19.
66. Loggins, supra note 50 quoting G. Forcinelli, Values Education in the Pub-
lic Schools, THRUST 14 (Mar. 1974), [hereinafter cited as Forcinellil.
67. R. Peters, A Reply to Kohlberg, 'Why D)oesn't Lawrence Kohlberg Do His
Homework?' PHI DELTA KAPPAN 678 (Jun. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Peters].
68. Harmin and Simon, supra note 53.
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"ought" to believe in "the principles of morality, truth, justice, pa-
triotism... kindness toward domestic pets. . ." etc.69 What is in
fact learned is "moral relativism which holds that any deeply held
view of right and wrong is as good as any other."70 As one profes-
sor observed:
[One gets] the distinct impression that all decisions arrived at through
the prescribed process are equally defensible and acceptable. The advo-
cates of values clarification do not seriously entertain such fundamental
questions as: assuming Adolph Hitler, Charles Manson, Martin Luther
King and Albert Schweitzer held values which met the seven criteria, are
their values equally valid, praiseworthy, and/or good?7 1
It appears, then, that to the extent a student presented with
modern values education arrived at legislatively prescribed val-
ues, he would have done so quite by accident. Further, he would
hold those values without any conviction that they were "right,"
but pursuant to a tentative conclusion that they "best suit him
and his environment."72
While it does not appear that a writ of mandate has yet been
brought against a school district to compel it to comply with the
statutorily prescribed curriculum; nor that a legislature has im-
posed sanctions for noncompliance, or even taken note of the situ-
ation and appended ". . . and we mean it!" to its legislation, this
problem, combined with the constitutional problems outlined
infra, make a judicial challenge of modern values education seem
inevitable.
B. Modern Values Education v. Religion
At least in a superficial sense, modern values education seems
an adequate response to courts and parents who objected to the
public schools indoctrinating students in the dogmas and
69. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 88705 (West 1978).
70. Graham, supra note 24 at 300.
71. A. Lockwood, A Critical View of Values Clarification, TEACHERS COLLEGE
RECORD 46 (Sept. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Lockwood]. Apparently stung by this
criticism, proponents of Values Clarification have taken pains to deny that a per-
son could pursue a Values Clarification curriculum and become like Hitler.
Kirschenbaum, (supra note 49, at 46) replied that "Hitler was clearly paranoid and
could not effectively use the choosing process of valuing." KiRSCHENBAUM,
HARwnq, HOWE & SIMON (1975), (supra note 53, at 4) assert that it was "the heavy
'moralizing, inculcating and indoctrination' which dominated values education
before World War I1 [which], in its extreme form, led to the horrors of the Nazi
regime." These replies could not be said to entirely address the objection.
72. Harmin and Simon, supra note 54.
precepts of state-approved religions. 73 Modern values education
does not attempt to influence character or behavior through reli-
gious exercises, nor does it preach that any one religion's teach-
ings or commandments are preferable to those of any other
religion. Thus, it can be argued that, it does not "aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another... or force [a
person] to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." 74 To the
contrary, it fosters "[f]reedom of thought, which includes free-
dom of religious belief, [and] is basic in a society of free men."75
Nevertheless, can it be said that modern values education theo-
ries "establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirma-
tively opposing or showing hostility to religion"?76
Certainly a religion of secularism is not established in the most
obvious sense. If anything is anathema to modern values educa-
tion it is "[mloralizing... the direct, although sometimes subtle,
inculcation of the adult's values upon the young."77 If "[tihe
teacher must never use values clarification strategies to moralize
or teach 'correct values' "78 it inexorably follows that the teacher
will not employ the theory to overtly preach the renunciation of
"incorrect values," whether religiously or otherwise derived.
Nevertheless, the facts that (1) there is considerable overlap
between the domains of "moral education" and religion; (2) mod-
ern values education, particularly Values Clarification, employs
its analytic method upon religious beliefs and practices them-
selves, sometimes with thinly veiled skepticism; (3) the relativis-
tic premise of the modes of analysis of modern values education
is contrary to the absolutistic premise of most Western religions
and it has been argued that it affects the way in which students
will come to approach their religions; and (4) the "secular pur-
poses" of modern values education, unlike statutorily prescribed
values education, are rather ill-defined, conjunctively raise seri-
ous questions concerning whether some aspects of modern values
education can successfully clear the hurdles erected by the Es-
tablishment Clause. 79
73. See text at notes 11, 19 & 25.
74. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
75. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
76. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; Epperson v. Arkansas
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
77. SIMON, HowE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 15-16.
78. HOWE & HowE, supra note 54, at 112; See Simon, supra note 54.
79. As was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a governmen-
tal action must pass three tests to be valid under the Establishment Clause of the
first amendment. First it "must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
... ; finally [it] . .. must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Id. at 612-13; Meek v. Pittenger 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1974).
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First, it can scarcely be denied that values education is deeply
involved in an area which is a traditional and principal concern of
religion. As the Executive Director of the Center for Moral Edu-
cation at Harvard University acknowledged:
Moral education can hardly avoid dealing with matters that have long
been the concern of religion; the right to life, personal obligation, and the
like. Nor can moral education escape questions of standards of moral be-
havior and the authority upon which they are based, whether that author-
ity stems from the dictates of social or religious institutions, of custom,
law, or moral principle.8 0
Secondly, not only do values education and religion share a
concern for the ethical standards which govern relations between
a person and the secular world, but modern values education and,
in particular, Values Clarification, devotes considerable attention
to encouraging students to "clarify" their religious beliefs so that
they might "choose freely," and "publicly affirm," their religious
convictions.8 1 Some of the questions asked impliedly challenge
certain religious ideas (e.g., "How many of you ... would choose
to die and go to heaven if it meant playing a harp all day?"), 82
while others are more neutrally phrased (e.g., "Do you believe in
God?"83: "What do you think happens to people after they
die?"8 4 ). Of course, the answers to these questions, like all
others, may be followed up by "clarifying questions," so that if,
for example, a student answered a question by indicating that he
believed in God, he might then be asked whether he "freely
chose" that belief, or whether it was impressed on him by his par-
ents, whether he is "proud of it," etc.85
A less obvious but more pervasive interface between modern
80. Graham, supra note 24, at 299. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. at 606 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg warns that "untutored de-
votion to the concept of neutrality" can result in "a brooding and pervasive devo-
tion to the secular" and "hostility to the religions." He insists that "[gjovernment
must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion and, indeed, under
certain circumstances the first amendment may require that it do so."
81. Supra notes 56 & 59.
82. SIMON, HowE, AND KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 43. As other exam-
ples, students are asked, "How many of you would be upset if organized religion
disappeared?" Id. at 51; "Are you getting anything out of [Sunday school or reli-
gious class]?" Id. at 140.
83. Id. at 143.
84. Id. at 157. Other representative questions include, "Are you more or less
religious than you were three years ago?" Id. at 144, "How many of you ... would
approve of a marriage between homosexuals being sanctioned by [a] priest, minis-
ter or rabbi?" Id. at 49.
85. See text at note 58 supra.
values education and religion radiates from the fact that in re-
jecting authoritarian indoctrination, modern values education has
moved to the opposite pole and embraced ethical relativism and
its holdings that values are "relative, personal, [and] situa-
tional."86 Therefore, "one person's values are as good as another's
. . . and when it comes to morality, there is no way of showing
that one opinion is better than another."87 By contrast, religions,
at least virtually all Western religions, make statements concern-
ing external spiritual reality, rather than personal preference, and
their ethics are premised on the existence of God having "a very
pronounced interest in good moral behavior88 and therefore "lay-
ing down a code for daily observance." 89
Modern values education, in line with its agnostic premise,90 es-
chews "the assumption that absolute goods exist and can be
known"91 and asserts that no proof exists as to the validity of any
value.92 It therefore advocates that a person should "choose
freely" and "from alternatives" values which happen to "best suit
him and his environment,"93 much as one might choose produce
in a supermarket.
From a religious perspective, this is incorrect. As God has pre-
scribed what constitutes good moral behavior, one's task is not to
choose values from a range of alternatives, but to discover the
true values, and the validity of a person's moral obligations de-
pends not at all on whether it "suits him,"94 still less on whether
86. Harmin and Simon, supra note 53.
87. Lockwood, supra note 71, at 47; see note 53 supra and accompanying text.
88. J. Noss, MAN's RELIGIONS, 342 (1969).
89. Id.
90. See note 53 supra.
91. Harmin and Simon supra note 53.
92. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 49 at 14.
93. Harmin and Simon, supra note 53, at 694; note 56 supra.
94. There is a subtle but profound difference between teaching that people
have a democratic right to their own opinions on moral and religious questions,
and teaching that "one person's values are as good as another's." Lockwood,
supra note 71. In the words of an old saying "People have a right to be wrong but
that doesn't make it right to be wrong."
Put another way, if a teacher instructed children that "There is no God," few
would have trouble seeing that this violates the Establishment Clause. Is it quali-
tatively different to teach that "If God exists, he imposes no moral obligations on
you; no one can know what He wants us to do, so you should do what best suits
you and your environment," or "Even if you believe in God and think you know
what moral standards He requires, your neighbor is not behaving in a morally ob-
jectionable way if he violates those standards"? The religious tenets of most
Americans are premised on the opposite belief,, that God has imposed moral obli-
gations applicable to all and demands obedience to them. E.g., Deut. 11:28; Jonah
1, 3; John 15:10, H Cor. 10:5-6.
While the legal standards which govern such conflicts are analyzed infra, suffice
it to posit here that if the above lessons are being taught and learned (Lockwood
supra note 71 at 48) and if they do constitute a prohibited "indoctrination in ulti-
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it suits his environment.95
Of course, Values Clarification extends beyond moral and reli-
gious issues to weighty questions such as\whether the students
"like yogurt?"96 "use a spray deodorant?" 97 "would like to change
(their) hair style?"98 and "like frozen custard better than regular
ice cream?"99 Critics of this theory have charged that not only
has it "confused nonmoral issues with moral ones,"'100 but that it
applies the same method to both and teaches that they are to be
resolved in the same manner--on the basis of personal prefer-
ence.101 It is thus asserted that study in a discipline grounded in
ethical relativism will increase "the possibility that ... students
will embrace ethical relativism as their moral point of
view-clearly an achievement of dubious merit."102
This leads us to the justifications advanced for teaching modern
values education methods in the public schools. Not surprisingly,
no claim is made for modem values education, as could be made
for a fair amount of legislatively prescribed values education, that
it "precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important in-
terests."103 As was set forth above, modern values education is
not directed toward the inculcation of any particular values, re-
gardless of their importance to society. Therefore, it would not be
inconsistent with the premise of such methods if the student
were to adopt values considered by society to be deviant. 0 4
For Values Clarification, the justification is psychological. Prior
to being trained in Values Clarification, young people are said to
experience "values confusion," which manifests itself in the
symptoms of "apathy, flightiness, extreme uncertainty, and incon-
sistency; drift, overconformity, overdissension, and chronic pos-
mate values" (Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Mich. 1965), it can
make no difference whether they are explicitly set forth in hornbooks, or implicit
in the methodused, or even subliminal. See text at note 179 infra.
95. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 citing Romans 12:2 "be not con-
formed to this world," see e.g., John 15:18-19, 17:14.
96. SIMON, HoWE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52 at 45.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 56.
100. Graham, supra note 24 at 300.
101. Id.
102. Lockwood, supra note 71 at 48.
103. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16.
104. See text at notes 66-70 supra.
ing, and, frequently, underachieverment."105 Those who attain
value clarity, on the other hand, rid themselves of these ailments
and are "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, [and] proud."10 6
The "moral stage" theory, on the other hand, proceeds on the
assumption that the higher stages, being more advanced, are "bet-
ter" and therefore ought to be attained. 07
Scant case authority guides us to a resolution of the question of
whether these theories are sufficiently hostile to religion as to vio-
late the Establishment Clause, or whether the posited conflicts
are 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental.' "108 Some few guidelines
can be stated, but the conclusions must ultimately rest on opin-
ion, or more accurately, prediction.
First, it is no defense to a charge that modern values education
violates the Establishment Clause to say that it does not "pro-
mote a 'state religion'."109 Similarly it is no defense to argue that
students are not forced to respond to questions they disapprove
of.110 It is, however, settled that "the state has no legitimate inter-
est in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to
them.""'
But does modern values education offend the tests for validity
under the Establishment Clause synthesized by Lemon v.
Kurtzman?" 2 To the extent that Values Clarification turns its
guns on the tenets of religion itself, it; would appear to be prohib-
ited. Obviously, those questions which impliedly scorn tenets
105. L. RATHs, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, VALUES AND TEACHING, 8 (1966) [herein-
after cited as RATHs, HARMIN, & SIMON], quoted in Lockwood, supra note 71, at 35.
106. RATHS, HARMIN & SIMON, supra note 105, at 5.
107. Fraenkel, supra note 61; see Peters, supra note 67.
108. Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
109. Id. at 771, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612. Nonetheless it is an
interesting question whether ethical relativism might constitute a "religion" in
light of (1) the absence of a widely accepted legal definition of "religion"; (2) that
belief in God has been held to no longer be the sine qua non of religious belief;
and (3) that it does conform to several definitions which have been advanced. See
Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 533
(1965); A. MORRIS, THE CONsTrrTUON AND AMERICAN EDUCATION, 374, 437 (1974),
reprinting Note: "Sectarian Books, The Supreme Court; but see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216, distinguishing choices which are "philosophical and per-
sonal" such as those of Thoreau which lead him into temporary isolation at
Walden Pond, and those which are "religious," such as those of the Amish which
lead them to keep their children over the age of fourteen out of public school.
110. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221. Whether students are,
in legal congnizance, so forced, is discussed infi'a. So long as the message is clear,
it does not matter whether it is overtly preached or part of the "hidden curricu-
lum." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211-19; (see also notes 176-180 infra).
111. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968), quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). The Epperson Court struck down an Arkansas
statute forbidding instruction in the theory of evolution in state-supported schools
and universities.
112. See note 79, supra.
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which may be held by various religions l13 are invalid. Questions
which show hostility to religious institutions or their doctrines as
their primary purpose, cannot be justified.114 Likewise, those
questions which seek to probe the content or origin of a student's
religious beliefs, and practices, and his feelings of "pride," "enjoy-
ment" or lack of same concerning them would seem to be prohib-
ited, if not on the ground that they are hostile to religious beliefs,
at least on the ground that they constitute "excessive entangle-
ment" of religion and the educational system. It may or may not
be that students whose religious beliefs are unclear show "apa-
thy, flightiness, extreme uncertainty." Notwithstanding the con-
tent of the questions, any serious effort by the state to guide
students in "clarifying" their relationships with God and their
churches cannot but involve government in religious matters to
an impermissible degree.ll 5
Whether imbuing children with ethical relativism contrary to
the teachings of their religions violates the Establishment Clause
presents a closer question, a question which turns on the validity
of the posited "secular purpose"116 and whether it can be justly
said that the "principal or primary effect" of such instruction "in-
hibits religion."ll 7
At the outset, there is no requirement that the "secular justifi-
cation" for modern values education be accepted at face value. In
DeSpain v. DeKalb Community School District 428,118 for exam-
ple, a school prayer was defended on the ground that reciting it
would promote "'good manners' and 'gratitude'."1 9 The court re-
fused to accept the proposition that any activity "of whatever na-
ture could be justified by public officials on the basis that the
activity has beneficial secular purposes;" 20 otherwise the
Supreme Court's admonitions in Engel and Schempp would be-
113. See text at note 82 supra.
114. Note 76 supra.
115. At least one court has recognized the incompatability of such classroom
exercises with the Establishment Clause. In Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. at 56,
the court ordered that "no themes will be assigned on such topics as 'Why I be-
lieve or disbelieve in religious devotions."'
116. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 601; see e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 343 U.S.
495.
117. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 601.
118. DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist. 428, 384 F.2d 838 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
119. Id. at 839.
120. Id.
come meaningless. As a factual matter, it is doubtful that those
who "live in mental confusion or moral anarchy and seek vaguely
for truth and beauty and moral support"121 will be much com-
forted by the tenets of ethical relativism.
Whether the schools have been entrusted by the legislatures
with providing generally dispensed patent therapy for "apathy,
flightiness, extreme uncertainty, and inconsistency; drift, overcon-
formity, [and] overdissension. .. "122 may also be justly question-
ed.
As previously noted,123 little attempt has been made to justify
modern values education on the ground that it instills values im-
portant to society, especially in light of the fact that this "educa-
tional system can produce a dishonest and potentially
dysfunctional product, and then merely say that these are legiti-
mate expressions of individual preferences."124 If the courts ac-
cord little weight to such secular justifications as have been
proffered, then the remaining "principal or primary effect" will be
the inhibition of religious belief.125
C. Modern Values Education v. The Right of Privacy
No doubt few Americans would express outrage should a gov-
ernment employee, say a census taker, query whether they "like
yogurt." 126 Perhaps some would wince should the inquiry be: "Do
you use a spray deodorant?"'127 Should the question be, however.
"Are you more like a 'No Trespassing' sign or a 'Public Fishing'
121. United States v. Ballard, 332 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
122. RAHs, HAaImN & SIMON, supra note 105. The striking similarity between
Values Clarification and Rogerian client-centered therapy is explored at some
length in Lockwood, supra note 71. One of the more troubling aspects of this
"treatment" is that the proponents of Values Clarification recommend that a child
with actual emotional problems not participate in Values Clarification because it
"may even add to his disturbances." Id. at 41, quoting RATHS, HARMIN & SIMON,
supra, note 105 at 82. Yet students are not screened for "emotional problems," nor
is parental consent typically obtained prior to subjecting students to the program.
123. See text at notes 103-104 supra.
124. Forcinelli, supra note 66, at 14. See text at notes 71-72 supra.
125. The justifications for modern values education curricula can be profitably
compared with those which have been proferred for factual instruction in the ar-
eas of health, family life and sex education. See Citizens for Parental Rights v.
San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976). Here the court upheld a program of factual instruc-
tion where teachers were instructed to refer students to their parents and reli-
gious counselors for moral guidance on sensitive issues on such topics as abortion,
birth control and divorce. The program was found to be justified in that it prima-
rily involved education in public health matters. See Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of
Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914, 921 (1971); Sex Education: The Constitu-
tional Limits of State Compulsion, 43 So. CAl. L. REv. 548 (1970).
126. SIMON, HowE & KIRScHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 45.
127. Id.
[Vol. 6: 105, 1978] Values Education
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sign?";128 or, "What was your most intense religious experi-
ence?"; 2 9 or even, "Are you a thoughtful lover?"; 130 all but the
most polite or intimidated would reply "none of your business!"
Should the response be different if these questions are asked of
children by those in authority?
This problem has not gone entirely unrecognized. The Califor-
nia Legislature, for example, enacted the following statute:
No test, questionnaire, survey, or examination containing any questions
about the pupil's personal beliefs or practices in sex, family life, morality
and religion, or any questions about his parents' or guardians' beliefs and
practices in sex, family life, morality and religion, shall be administered to
any pupil in kindergarten or grade 1 through grade 12, inclusive, unless
the parent or guardian of the pupil is notified in writing that such test,
questionnaire, survey or examination is to be administered and the parent
or guardian of the pupil gives written permission for the pupil to take
such test, questionnaire, survey or examination.
1 3 1
Is there a constitutional right for children to be free of intrusive
questioning on intimate personal and family matters? In Merriken
v. Cress-man132 the court reviewed a questionnaire which posed
such questions as "whether the student's family is 'very close,
somewhat close, not too close, or not close at all1 33 . . .whether
(the parents) 'hugged and kissed him good-night when he was
small' . . . whether they told him how 'much they loved him or
her'. . . whether the parents 'seemed to know what the student's
needs or wants are'... and whether the student 'feels that he is
loved by his parents'.. .-134
The court held that this questionnaire violated both the par-
ent's and the child's "right to privacy inherent in the penumbras
of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution."135 The
court determined that there was a violation of the right to privacy
despite the fact that a good reason was presented for administer-
ing the test (to identify potential drug abusers).136
128. Supra note 59.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60650 (West 1978). Unfortunately this statute, which
would appear on its face to outlaw a sizeable segment of the Values Clarification
curriculum, is, in the author's experience, little known nor long remembered.
132. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F.Supp. 913 (E.D. Penn. 1973).
133. Id. at 918.
134. Id. at 922.
135. The court held that the consent was not "informed." Id. at 919.
136. The court ruled that insufficient evidence was presented that the test
would, in fact, fight drug abuse, and that the results of the test might be misused.
Id. at 921.
Similarly, in Prince v. Massachusett. 37the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that there is a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter."
There can be no meaningful distinction between the questions
posed in Merriken138 and such Values Clarification questions as
whether the student is "completely indifferent to family; would
rather be rid of them";139 "What disturbs you most about your
parents"?140 or "How many of you.., feel closer to one of your
parents than the other."' 4 ' There is also no basis for distinguish-
ing between family life as within the realm protected by the right
of privacy and other "fundamental interests" such as beliefs and
practices in the areas of sex, morality and religion. 42
Finally, and for the same reasons that no valid "primary secular
purpose" was demonstrated to justify interference with religious
rights, 143 no "compelling state interest" can be demonstrated to
justify such prying into intimate areas of the lives of school chil-
dren; nor, for that matter, is the curriculum so "narrowly drawn
[as] to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."'"
The problem extends beyond the fact that intimate questions
are asked, however. It is a fundamental tenet of Values Clarifica-
tions that a value is not really a "value" until it is expressed
openly. The approach therefore consists of questions "which help
students learn to . .. [s] hare and publicly affirm their values"
137. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The court, however,
found an overriding state interest in child protection laws, thus narrowing the ex-
tent of that "private realm."
138. Supra note 133.
139. SIMON, HowE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 52, at 121.
140. Id. at 148.
141. Id. at 48. Other examples abound, e.g., "How many of you ... would like
to have different parents? ... feel embarrassed when your friends meet your par-
ents? ... feel free to discuss sex with your parents?... are the favorite child in
your family?" Id. at 46-55.
142. Justice Brandeis thought privacy "the most comprehensive of rights,"
which extended to protect persons from prying into "their beliefs, their thoughts
and their sensations." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissent-
ing opinion), quoted in Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col.,
331 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., concurring). However, recent
cases seem to have limited its application to "fundamental" interests. Cf. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The above areas are well within the protected
zone. See, e.g., Population Services International v. Wilson, 398 F.Supp. 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), stating that although "the reach of the constitutional right of pri-
vacy has yet to be determined," Supreme Court decisions "have made it clear that
protection extends to "'the most intimate phases of personal life' having to do
with sexual intercourse and its possible consequences." See also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
143. See text at notes 116-124 supra.
144. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155; see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-12 (1972)
(Douglas J., concurring).
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before their classmates. 145
A proponent of Values Clarification might agree that there ex-
ists a "right to remain silent as respects one's own beliefs," 146 and
yet vigorously insist that this right is not abrogated as the teacher
"must allow students to 'pass' or not participate in any personal
inquiry and values activities."147 Does this eliminate any
problems?
In Merriken v. Cressmanl48 "the children [were] never given
the opportunity to consent to the invasion of their privacy; only
the opportunity to refuse to consent by returning a blank ques-
tionnaire."14 9 While the court was not required to rule on the con-
stitutionality of this procedure, it was termed "questionable."15o
Of course, in Merriken, the children were only responding to a
written questionnaire, and would not have been required to re-
fuse to answer the questions in the presence of their classmates.
Several jurists have recognized the compulsion inherent in the
latter situation. As Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion subscribed
to by three other justices, stated:
That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to
conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation oper-
ates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic of chil-
dren.1 51
Justice Brennan, concurring in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp,152 voiced a similar concern:
[Rieluctance to seek exemption seems all the more likely in view of the
fact that children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or flout
'peer-group norms.' Such is the widely held view of experts who have
studied the behaviors and attitudes of children. 153
Justice Brennan also cited a Wisconsin Supreme Court case
which held that "the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows,
145. HOwE & HoWE, &upra note 54 at 177; Kirschenbaum, Harmin, Howe & Si-
mon (1975), supra note 53 at 3; RATHs, HARmIN & SIMON, supra note 105, at 28;
Lockwood, supra note 71, at 36.
146. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 211 (Douglas J. Concurring).
147. HOWE & HOWE, supra note 54 at 113; SIMON, HOWE & KIRSCHENBAUM, supra
note 52, at 26.
148. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F.Supp. 913.
149. Id. at 919; compare Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd.
of Educ., supra at note 125.
150. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F.Supp. at 919.
151. McColum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
152. 374 U.S. 203.
153. Id. at 290. See majority opinion at 208 n.3, noting parental fear that dis-
senting children might be labeled "oddballs."
and is liable to be regarded with aversion, and be subjected to re-
proach and insult. ' 154 Many other cases are to the same effect' 5 5
and recognize, with Justice Douglas, that "[c]ompulsion which
comes from circumstances can be as real as compulsion which
comes from a command."'165
Compulsory education laws and the placing of the teachers in
loco parentis over the children157 indicate that the premise of
public education is hardly voluntarism, and "it cannot be ac-
cepted as a premise that the student is voluntarily in the class-
room and willing to be exposed to a teaching method."158
Beyond this, it has been forcefully argued' 59 that students who
must publicly respond to intimate questions will give responses
believed to be acceptable to their classmates. Supporters of this
argument cite research that has shown that when people take
public positions or are forced to act they tend to cling to the be-
liefs or values involved, even if those beliefs or values are tenta-
tive or not genuinely held at the time of the commitment or
action."160 Thus inducing children to alter their beliefs in inti-
mate areas of their lives is a far more serious invasion of personal
privacy than inducing them to reveal those areas to public scru-
tiny. It may be questioned whether the courts will sanction such
an enterprise in the name of "clarification."1 6 1
154. Id. at 292, citing State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 8, 76
Wis. 177, 200, 44 N.W. 967, 975 (1890). See other cases cited at 374 U.S. at 292-93.
155. See cases cited in J. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MiN. L. REv. 329, 344-45 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Choper].
156. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (dissenting opin-
ion). See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431, discussing the "indirect coercive pres-
sure" of governmental support. As was noted in Citizens for Parental Rights v.
San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d at 18, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 81, the de-
gree of pressure is greater when the students are "in direct and immediate contact
with their peers when they exercise their beliefs" than when their parents excuse
them from a discrete course. The "pass" system (supra note 147) is a subspecies
of the former situation, and the infusion of modern values education throughout
the curriculum (Kirschenbaum, supra note 49, at 120 et. seq.) may make the latter
option impracticable.
157. See generally Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 648 n.119, which discusses the
decline of the in loca parentis doctrine as a means of implying a parental delega-
tion of authority in an age of compulsory attendance laws.
158. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F.Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1970), afd 448 F.2d 1242
(1971) See also Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.Supp. 48, 52 (1965). ("Children attend-
ing public grade schools are effectively captives").
159. J. Stewart, Clarilying Values Clarification: A Critique, PHI DELTA KAPPAN
160 (1975).
160. Id. at 685; See generally W. SARGANTr, BATTLE FOR THE MiND (1957).
161. As former California Chief Justice Traynor once wrote, "Great as a state's
police power is, however, the United States Supreme Court has yet to sanction its
breaking into people's minds to make them orderly." First Unitarian Church v.
County of LA., 48 Cal. 2d 419, 448, 311 P.2d 508, 526 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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D. Values Education v. Parental Rights
As we have seen,162 to the extent that public schools attempt to
mold the personal values of their charges, they run the risk of pa-
rental ire should those values be contrary to those taught in the
home.163 As one court asked, in a case involving compulsory sex
education:
Is the State, through the educational system, permitted to encroach upon
the patterns and molding of a child's behavior in personal, family or reli-
gious beliefs? Parental discipline, authority and respect diminish as the
great soveriegn state forces its way into the home as a foster parent.
Some parents may be happy to be relieved of the obligation and responsi-
bility. Others may feel that the constant eroding of their usefulness as
parents portends great danger, and youth will look to the state, rather
than the parent, for guidance.16 4
The dilemma here, of course, is that not all parents establish a cli-
mate of "discipline, authority and respect," and thus, the task of
socialization falls heavily upon the schools.
5 6
The courts have, for the most part, resolved this dilemma by al-
lowing parents to excuse their children from programs which of-
fend parental values,166 at least where the request is not
unreasonable and no strong state interest in the subject matter
can be demonstrated.167 In Hardwick v. Board of School
Trustees,168 for example, a father refused to permit his children to
participate in dance classes on moral grounds, and they were ex-
pelled from school. The California court ordered their reinstate-
ment, stressing that the case "involves the right of parents to
control their own children-to require them to live up to the
teachings and the principles which are inculcated in them at
162. See text at notes 16, 19 & 39.
163. Modern values education, of course, is not immune from this problem.
KrISCHENBAUM, supra note 49, at 53 observes: "A minority of parents tend to op-
pose value clarification. They see it as a threat to their authority at home, which is
partly true. A thinking person is always a threat to authoritarian leadership."
164. Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 76, 274 A.2d
832, 839 (1971).
165. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). Purpel and Ryan,
supra note 24, at 660.
166. See, e.g., Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874); Trustees of Schools v. People
ex rel. Van Allen, 87 IMI. 303 (1877); Rulison v. Post, 79 1. 567 (1875); State ex rel.
Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891); State v. Ferguson, 95
Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 1039 (1914); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P.
610 (1927). These cases did not involve religious values, but the result in such
cases is not different. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
167. People ex. rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 278, 255 P. at 613.
168. 54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921).
home under the parental authority."''" 9 The court asked:
Has the state the right to enact a law or confer upon any public authori-
ties a power the effect of which would be to alienate in a measure the chil-
dren from parental authority? ... [T]o answer ... in the affirmative
would be to give sanction to a power over home life that might result in
denying to parents their natural as well as their constitutional right to
govern or control, within the scope of just parental authority, their own
progeny.1
7 0
A different question is, of course, presented where parents use
this ground as a basis, not for excluding their own children, but
for removing the allegedly offensive subject matter from the cur-
riculum, thus giving them a veto power over what is presented to
the children of others. The courts have refused to recognize pa-
rental rights in this context.171 Where exemptions from the
course of instruction are not otherwise available,172 however,
some viability remains in this ground of objection.
III. VALuEs EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A PROPOSED
RECONCILIATION
American public schools have often defended extreme positions
in the area of values education. These positions have ranged from
the overt endorsing of religious indoctrination of colonial days,
when children were taught to "By no Sin Stray"'173 to more subtle
indoctrination in the position that there are no "right" values and
that children ought to reject the values of their parents or their
church except insofar as they have freely chosen them from alter-
natives,174 to the position that "education should be concerned ex-
clusively with the development of cognitive rationality and
169. Id. at 709, 205 P. at 54.
170. Id.
171. Medieros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970); Rosenberg v. Board
of Educ. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 344 (1949); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314
F.Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff"d, 428 F.2d 471 (1970); Citizens for Parental Rights v.
San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., supra note 125; Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ.,
supra note 125.
172. Some states, in particular response to objections to sex education curric-
ula, have fashioned statutory exemptions to instruction in conflict with parental
values. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51240 (West 1978), for example, provides:
Whenever any part of the instruction in health, family life education,
and sex education conflicts with the religious training and beliefs of the
parent or guardian of any pupil, the pupil, on written request of the parent
or guardian, shall be excused from the part of the training which conflicts
with such religious training and beliefs.
As used in this section, "religious training and beliefs" includes per-
sonal moral convictions.
In other states, excusal is a matter of local option, or is disallowed. Constitutional-
ity under the Religion Clauses of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68
MICH. L REV. 1050 (1970).
173. Text at note 15, supra.
174. Text at notes 53-55 supra.
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intellectual skills, eschewing values and ideologies of all
kinds."17
5
The first two positions have been found to stand on legally in-
defensible grounds, and the third position, in the event it is
thought to be desirable, is unattainable. "Education is simply not
value-free. One cannot involve a child in schooling from the time
he is 6 until he is 17 or 21 and not affect the way he thinks about
moral issues and the way he behaves. '176 Overt moral instruction
may be eliminated from the curriculum, but values will neverthe-
less be taught through the medium of the "hidden curricu-
lum"-the rules and regulations which govern the operation of
the schools, the models which are held up to the children for em-
ulation, and the attitudes of approval or disapproval with which
those in authority greet certain behaviors and attitudes. 177 The
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder178 recognized the existence
of such a "hidden curriculum" in the high school, with its empha-
sis on "intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinc-
tion, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other
students"179 which, although not overtly taught, was found to be
175. R. Rhinelander, Can Integrity Be Taught?, THE STANFORD MAGAZINE, 48
(Fall-Winter 1976); text at note 24 supra.
176. Purpel and Ryan, supra note 24, at 662.
177. See Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1424 n.265 (1976). As was illustrated by Purpel and Ryan,
supra note 24, at 661-62:
Schools certainly do 'teach' about authority, about what is right and
wrong, and about priorities in the maze of school policies, practices, and
traditions.
There are, of course, explicit rules and regulations in the schools about
attendance ('unexcused absences will result in suspension'), behavior
('no running in the halls or on the stairs'), dress ('no hats, no bare mid-
riffs, no bare feet'), punctuality ('two times late equals one hour deten-
tion') . . . and the like. The quality and flexibility of these rules and
regulations vary from school to school, but they convey a particular set of
values held strongly enough to warrant their enforcement.
More difficult to discern and capture, but of undoubted significance, are
the moral dimensions of the countless personal interactions among teach-
ers, administrators, and students. Teachers reward and punish children
for a variety of things: classroom performance ('those finished with their
assignment may take a recess'), classroom behavior ('I wish all of you
were as courteous and polite as Hilary'), some personality characteristics
('I do not recommend Nancy as a cheerleader because she has an uncoop-
erative and negative attitude'), effort ('no one in my classroom who has
really tried has ever gotten an F'), responsibility ('if the person who wrote
the note does not own up, all of you will have to stay after school').
See Peckenpaugh, supra note 48, at 11.
178. Supra note 3.
179. 406 U.S. at 211.
incompatible with competing Amish values. As Lawrence
Kohlberg, one of the chief protagonists of values education aptly
stated:
The most common system of moral education in America is neither
"character education," not "values clarification," nor a cognitive-develop-
mental approach, instead, it is no conscious system at all-the "hidden
curriculum." 18 0
Even if values education could be eliminated from the schools,
such a move would be contrary to the oft-neglected commands
from the legislatures that the schools proceed with this difficult
and controversial enterprise.181 The question, then, is not
whether there shall be values education in the public schools, but
how it may be accomplished lawfully,, and hopefully, wisely.
The basic, and legally most critical, foundation of a defensible
values education program is the identification of a valid, clearly
articulable, adequate, and preferably compelling, governmental
interest which is being served by the program. The shoals on
which existing and prior programs have foundered may be rein-
terpreted as the absence of any obvious state interest.
Those programs which involved religious exercises or indoctri-
nation,182 may be said to have failed because the first amendment
removed the advancement of religion as a legitimate interest of
the state. Those programs designed to "standardize" children
through restricting the teaching of foreign languages,183 outlawing
attendance at private schools,184 or compelling participation in pa-
triotic exercises, 185 may be said to have failed because the
Supreme Court rejected the proposition that there is any state in-
terest in "[c]ompulsory unification of opinion,"'186 and because no
other legitimate state interest, nor reasonable probability that the
program would contribute to that interest, was demonstrated.
The Yoder case187 may be explained on the basis that no state in-
terest requiring children to attend secondary schools was shown
to be of sufficient importance to justify the harm done to the reli-
gious interests of the Amish.188 The search for a strong state in-
terest is the heart of our quest, for if no state interest in a school
program is delineated, the program will fall on due process
180. L. Kohlberg, Special Section in Perspective, SOCLAL. EDUCATION, NATIONAL
Corcm FOR THE SocIAL STUDIES 215 (April 1976) quoted in R. Hill, Schools of
Thought, Part II, CALIFORNIA SCHOOL BOARDS 13 (Sept. 1976); See note 62 supra.
181. See text at notes 42-43 supra.
182. Supra note 35.
183. Supra note 25.
184. Id.
185. Supra note 31.
186. Text at note 34 supra.
187. Supra note 3.
188. 406 U.S. at 222, 224-25, 228-29, 234.
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grounds. 189 However, if a compelling state interest can be demon-
strated, few claims alleging violations of individual rights will be
able to prevail. 9 0
How, then, can we articulate the interest of the state in values
education so that a new program might be built around it? Why
are the schools, whose employees have been trained to be purvey-
ors of knowledge, not philosophies,191 involved in this volatile en-
terprise?
The courts, in setting forth the interests of the state in requiring
education have often been less than lucid, and their formulations
of the "state interest" have not often been broad enough to en-
compass values education. 92
One formulation, taking into account the role of values educa-
tion is that:
The state seeks through its educational system to achieve two goals: the
development of the basic reading, writing and other academic skills that
any productive member of society must possess; and the inculcation of
values deemed essential for a cohesive, harmonious and law-abiding soci-
ety.1 9 3
However, this formulation of the role of values education is in-
complete, for in stressing only its socializing role in helping
achieve "a cohesive, harmonious and law-abiding society" this
test would countenance the efforts at "[c] ompulsory unification of
opinion" 94 repeatedly condemned by the Supreme Court as
achieving "only the unanimity of the graveyard,"195 and would be
equally applicable to the purpose of values education under a to-
talitarian regime. The Supreme Court has recognized that it is
not solely conformity to essential rules but "hazardous freedom
... openness.., that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in
this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society."'196 Closer
to the mark in setting forth the role of values education is the for-
mulation of the California Supreme Court, which defined "the
role of public education as a unifying social force and the basis
189. E.g., In re R. 357 N.Y.S. 2d 1001, 1003 (1974).
190. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
191. Supra note 46.
192. Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 626-27, n.17.
193. 74 MICH. L. REV. at 1373, supra note 177.
194. Supra notes 184-85.
195. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
196. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
tool for shaping democratic values."197
Perhaps these conceptions can be synthesized by positing that
the compelling state interest in values education as such is that it
is "an element necessary for the sustenance and preservation of
our modern state [and] one of the bulwarks of democratic govern-
ment."198 Under this test, there could be no valid objection, on re-
ligious, or privacy grounds, or any other, should the schools teach,
for example, that theft is "wrong," or that democratic freedoms
are "better" than totalitarian repression, or that it is "wrong" to
attempt to achieve even needed reforms through violent means in
a democratic society.
There is no reason to suppose that teaching "such universally
accepted values as justice, property rights, respect for law and au-
thority, and brotherhood"199 would either conflict with religious
teaching or require theological doctrine or religious sanctions to
be persuasive.200 As one example:
The public school teaches brotherhood as part of the democratic ideal.
The churches teach it as a response to God's commandment to love one's
neighbor. The secular humanist practices it as an expression of a purely
human value.201
While this conception is quite basic, it serves to return educa-
tors to the purpose of their curricula and provides courts with a
ready yardstick against which to measure claims of constitutional
infringement. While it will still, on occasion, be difficult to deter-
mine close questions concerning whether one educational innova-
tion or another is necessary and proper to the attainment of this
end, it clearly reveals the banal irrelevance of "Do you like yo-
gurt?"2 0 2 and the voyeuristic impropriety of "Are you a thoughtful
lover?" 20 3
A fresh examination of values education will not only require
consideration of the written course of instruction, but will neces-
sitate a long-neglected reordering of the "hidden curriculum, ' 204
for its lessons are the most lasting. "[T] here is persuasive author-
ity for the view that moral values are better learned through con-
197. Serrano v. Priest, supra note 8.
198. Manone v. Haden, 329 Pa. 213, 233, 197 A. 344, 352, (1938); E.g. People v.
Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 280, 255 P. 610, 613, (1927). 'The state, for its own protection,
may require children to be educated. This needs no citation."
199. Choper, supra note 155 at 377.
200. Id. at 377-78.
201. Id. at 377 n.301, citing COMM'N ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION OF THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST, Relation of Religion to Public Ed-
ucation-A Study Document, INTERNATIONAL J. OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, 21, 25
(Apr. 1960).
202. Supra note 95.
203. Supra note 130.
204. Supra notes 176-179.
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crete examples during the school day than through lessons that
preach them."205 Given the importance of values education, we
must at least be certain that the "hidden curriculum" does not
contradict the formal one.20 6 As one superintendent told the Na-
tional Conference on Citizenship Education:
The most important learning that the schools foster are in the way they
treat people, rather than what they say about behavior. The examples are
numerous. We often talk of the dignity of man while destroying it in our
students. We talk of the virtue of kindness and are sarcastic. We talk of
honesty and truth and demonstrate in our daily life that we subscribe to a
different set of values. It slowly becomes obvious as to which values we
hold. Children model after the real us, and the moral education that we
really teach takes hold. They become "as we do, not as we say."
2 0 7
The law, of course, can only remedy certain wrongs, it cannot
make people right. For all its excesses, Values Clarification has
recognized that the beginning of that task is self-examination, a
process which the courts are forcing upon education itself.
205. Choper, supra note 155 at 378.
206. Shanley v. Northwest Ind. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir. 1972); R.
MASTERS, WHY EDUCATION FAILS (1974); SIMON, HOWE & KiRSCHENBAUM, supra
note 52, at 17.
207. Peckenpaugh, supra note 48 at 11.

